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iable unilaterally, but faces competition from a political opponent in the future. Both parties care about voters'
payoffs, but they have different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes. We
show that when the incumbent party can endogenously inﬂuence whether learning occurs through its policy
choices (policy experimentation), future political competition gives it a new incentive to distort its policies —
itmanipulates them so as to reduce uncertainty and disagreement in the future, thus avoiding facing competitive
electionswith anopponent very different from itself. Themodel thus demonstrates that all incumbents canﬁnd it
optimal to ‘over experiment’, relative to a counterfactual in which they are sure to be in power in both periods.
We thus identify an incentive for strategic policymanipulation that does not depend onparties having conﬂicting
objectives, but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
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Many of the most important public policy problems democratic
countries face require cumulative efforts by successive governments
to be successfully managed. Consider environmental policy (in particu-
lar regulation of stock pollutants such as greenhouse gases), social secu-
rity reform, sovereign debt management, and public infrastructure
development. None of these issues can be tackled in a single legislative
term, and the total quantity of resources devoted to them will likely be
the result of decisions taken by several governments. As such, the poli-
cies incumbent political parties choose to address these issues are
heavily inﬂuenced by the incentives that the political system provides
for them to make sound ‘long-run’ policy decisions, even if the effects
of those decisions may only be realized once they have left ofﬁce.ferees for exceptionally helpful
dro Tavoni, Rick van der Ploeg,
, Oxford, Marseille, AERE'13,
cknowledges support from the
and the Grantham Foundation
s, Houghton St., London, WC2A
. This is an open access article underThe lack of future political control that is characteristic of democratic
systems means that, for the purposes of setting ‘long-run’ policies, in-
cumbents have incentives to manipulate their current policy choices
so as to inﬂuence both who gets elected in the future and the policy
choices future governments will make (Persson and Svensson, 1989;
Aghion and Bolton, 1990; Tabellini and Alesina, 1990; Milesi-Ferretti
and Spolaore, 1994; Besley and Coate, 1998; Persson and Tabellini,
2000; Azzimonti, 2011). These strategic incentives exist even if parties
are not purely ofﬁce seeking, but have interests that coincide with
those of a group of voters, e.g. in models of partisan politics. These ef-
fects have traditionally been studied in models with heterogeneous
preferences: parties are assumed to have intrinsically different prefer-
ence parameters, which induce heterogeneous preferences over poli-
cies, and hence a strategic incentive for an incumbent party to
manipulate present policy choices given that its reelection is uncertain.
While heterogeneity in preference parameters undoubtedly ac-
counts for some of the divergences between political parties’ preferred
policies, heterogeneity in beliefs is likely to be an equally important fac-
tor. Milton Friedman famously argued that “differences about economic
policy among disinterested citizens derive predominantly from differ-
ent predictions about the economic consequences of taking action…
rather than from fundamental differences in basic values” (Friedman,
1966). More recently, public surveys in the US demonstrate a strongthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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of policy issues, including, for example, the likely causes and severity of
climate change (Leiserowitz et al., 2012; Borick and Rabe, 2012). De-
spite the empirical plausibility of belief heterogeneity, the consequences
of relaxing the common prior assumption have been largely unexplored
in the political economy literature on strategic policy choice.2
The crucial new feature of political competition induced by hetero-
geneous beliefs is that beliefs are dynamic, and potentially endogenous.
Parties' policy preferences may change over time as their beliefs evolve
in response to new information. Moreover this learning process may, at
least to some extent, be under the control of the incumbent, who may
choose policies with the express purpose of revealing information
about their consequences in the future; learning may be ‘active’. Active
learning — the idea that current policy choices inﬂuence how much is
learned in the future — is an old concept in economics (e.g. Prescott,
1972; Grossman et al., 1977), which has been applied to problems in
monetary policy (Bertocchi and Spagat, 1993), environmental regula-
tion (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999), and ﬁrm behavior (Keller and Rady,
1999). It can be seen as a form of experimentation — we choose an ac-
tion, observe its consequences, and so learn something new about the
relationship between choices and outcomes. In addition, it is often the
case that themore intensely we pursue a policy, the more we can sepa-
rate the ‘signal’ from the ‘noise’, and themorewe learn about its effects.3
Thus when learning is active, and parties have divergent beliefs that
they update rationally, the incumbent party has a measure of control
over its own, and its opponent's, future policy preferences. This gives
rise to strategic incentives for policy manipulation that are entirely ab-
sent when parties merely have different preference parameters.
Our core contribution is to elucidate the interaction between belief
heterogeneity, active learning (or experimentation), and political com-
petition, and how this affects the size of public programswith uncertain
deferred beneﬁts (or costs). We focus on how the interaction between
these factors determines an incumbent's response to the intertemporal
tradeoff inherent in such problems. We thus abstract from questions of
taxation and redistribution, and consider a stylized model in which
voters differ only in their beliefs about the beneﬁts of the policy, and
parties that represent the beliefs of groups of voters must decide only
on the level of some policy variable. We show that the interaction
between active learning and political competition gives rise to a new in-
centive for incumbents to distort their policy choices. This incentive
pushes incumbents to choose policies that increase their chances of re-
solving uncertainty in the future, regardless of their beliefs: they will
over experiment. The intuition behind this result is simple — since the
preferences of parties with different a priori beliefs converge when
learning occurs, incumbents avoid future competitive elections with
an opponent very different from themselves by choosing policies that
reduce disagreement.
We demonstrate this mechanism in a two period model that com-
bines the literature on intertemporal decision making under uncertain-
ty and learning (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Henry, 1974; Epstein, 1980;2 Morris (1995) reviews the theoretical arguments for and against the common prior
assumption. Acemoglu et al. (2008) demonstrate that Bayesian updating does not gener-
ically lead to agreement on posteriors when agents are uncertain about the distribution of
possible signals. Glaeser and Sunstein (2013) and Fryer et al. (2013) consider alternative
models of belief polarization, andVan den Steen (2004, 2010) considermodels of ‘rational’
overoptimism that results from heterogeneous beliefs. We will simply treat belief hetero-
geneity as an empirical fact, and investigate its consequences for policy choice.
3 Here are two examples: Consider a policy that decentralizes educational decision
making (e.g. management and curriculumdecisions) from a central ministry to individual
schools. Our ability to discern the causal effect of such a policy on e.g. test scores increases
as more schools are included in the program. Next consider a policy that aims to set the
allowed level of emissions of a stock pollutant (e.g. greenhouse gases). Suppose that the
evolution equation for the stock of pollutant is parametrically uncertain, and contains ad-
ditive noise. The more of the pollutant we emit, the greater the level of the stock, and the
more our observations of the systemdepend on the underlying dynamics than on stochas-
tic variation. Hence our ability to learn the parameters of the system increases the more
we emit (see e.g. Kelly and Kolstad, 1999). Analogous reasoning holds for many public
policies.Gollier et al., 2000), with a simple but ﬂexible model of political compe-
tition (Wittman, 1973, 1983; Roemer, 2001). To demonstrate the effects
cleanly, themodel assumes that parties care only about the voters' well-
being, and disagree only in their beliefs. Thus, in the absence of belief
heterogeneity all parties in ourmodel would agree on the correct policy
choice, which would also be the optimal policy for the voters. Yet even
in the sanguine case where parties are well intentioned and have com-
mon objectives, heterogeneous beliefs and political competition will
distort their policy choices. We show that when learning is active
enough, all incumbents will over-experiment relative to a counterfactu-
al in which they are sure to be in power in the future, regardless of their
beliefs and the beliefs of their political opponents.
Section 2 sets out the model structure. Section 3 examines how the
interaction between active learning and political competition affects
policy choices when beliefs are heterogeneous, without specifying the
actual form of the political competition between parties. To build intui-
tion, a simplemodel with binary policy choices is discussed ﬁrst, follow-
ed by a more complex model with continuous policy choices. Section 4
specializes to a speciﬁc model of political competition: the Wittman
model. In our version of this model parties know the distribution of
the voters' beliefs, voters vote for their preferred platform, and elections
are decided bymajority rule.We show that our results hold under plau-
sible primitive conditions on the parties' payoff functions in this case,
which apply in both ‘full commitment’ and ‘no commitment’ versions
of the model. We reﬂect on the application of our results to a variety
of policy issues in Section 5, before concluding.
1.1. Related literature
While the consequences of heterogeneous beliefs and strategic
experimentation for the policy choices of incumbents are (to the best
of our knowledge) unexplored, several papers investigate some of
these factors in other contexts.
Piketty (1995) considers a model of social mobility and redistribu-
tive taxation, in which agents hold different beliefs about the relative
importanceof effort and social class in determining economic outcomes.
The beliefs of different agents are updated based on their incomemobil-
ity experience, and transmitted to their descendants. Piketty shows that
belief heterogeneity persists in the steady state, and that experience of
income mobility, and not simply income level, contributes to forming
political attitudes. While heterogeneous beliefs are at the core of this
work, it focusses on the voters' belief formation processes, and not on
strategic policy experimentation by incumbent governments.
Strulovici (2010) is explicitly concernedwith strategic experimenta-
tion, but focusses on strategic voters, rather than strategic parties. In
his model pivotal voters recognize that experimentation reduces their
likelihood of being pivotal in the future — this results in under-
experimentation in equilibrium. We focus on the behavior of strategic
parties that manipulate their current policies in part to inﬂuence the
beliefs of future voters. In contrast to Strulovici (2010), we show that
when parties have good faith disagreements with their political oppo-
nents, they have an incentive to over experiment.
Callander and Hummel (2013) consider a model that is in some re-
spects close to ours. They examine the efﬁciency of political turnover,
when the only link between successive governments is the information
they possess. Incumbents can experiment strategically to inﬂuence the
information that their successors will use to make their policy choices.
They show that, due to the time inconsistency issues that are inherent
in political systemswith turnover, experimentation can improve the ef-
ﬁciency of policies, as it creates a channel for intertemporal inﬂuence.
This informational channel of inﬂuence is also present in our work,
but thepolitical context differs. Parties have common beliefs but hetero-
geneous objectives in their model, and political turnover is imposed
exogenously. By contrast, parties in our model have common objectives
but heterogeneous beliefs, and the identity of future governments is
determined endogenously via competitive elections. This allows us to
4 Note that this assumption is consistent with Bayesian rationality. It is a simpliﬁcation
of the information revelation process (akin to that in e.g. Arrow and Fisher, 1974), and not
of the agents' responses to new information. A model with partial learning would be sig-
niﬁcantly more complex (see e.g. Epstein, 1980), and bring no new qualitative messages
about the core interactionwewish to examine. All thatwe require is that beliefs are ‘closer
together’ after observation of a common signal, and that the incumbent can inﬂuence the
likelihood (or strength) of the signal being received endogenously.
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experimentation, and heterogeneous beliefs.
Finally, Hirsch (2013) considers a model of political organization in
which a principal and an agent disagree about which policy to imple-
ment, but share the same objectives, and can engage in experimenta-
tion. Hirsch shows that it may be optimal for the principal to defer to
the agent to motivate him to act, or to demonstrate to the agent that
his beliefs are incorrect. While the fact that agents in his model differ
only in their beliefs is common to our analysis, the roles of the players
are exogenously assigned in his work. His model focusses on strategic
delegation in a hierarchical organization, rather than strategic interac-
tion between political parties.
Despite the differences in context between our work and that of the
last three papers mentioned above, a common overarching theme
unites them. In all these cases learning provides a channel for inﬂuence,
which is used to the advantage of a ‘ﬁrst-mover’. In Strulovici (2010)
this is the pivotal voter, in Hirsch (2013) it is the principal, and in
Callander and Hummel (2013) and our own work, it is an incumbent
government. Thus our work contributes to a wider recent research
program which sees information as a source of strategic control in a
variety of contexts.
2. The model
We consider a two period model, and assume two political parties,
indexed by i ∈ {G, B}. The parties are well-intentioned: they care only
about the voters' well-being, and don't seek ofﬁce for their own ends.
Our choice of labels for the parties is motivated by an environmental
interpretation of the model (‘G’ = Green, ‘B’ = Brown) which we will
use to provide intuition at several points in the exposition, but the
model is applicable much more widely.
In the ﬁrst period the incumbent party sets some policy variable e1,
which gives rise to certain ﬁrst period payoffs U(e1). Second period
payoffsW(e2|e1, λ) depend on the policy e2 that is implemented in the
second period, on the legacy of ﬁrst period policy choices e1, and on
an a priori uncertain parameter λ, which affects the optimal second
period policy. The conditions we impose on U andW will be discussed
below, for now we focus on the model structure.
It may be helpful to keep in mind an example of a long run policy.
Consider a case in which e1 and e2 correspond to the levels of a binding
cap on a stock pollutant, such as greenhouse gases, ozone, or sulfur
dioxide. Then we might have
U e1ð Þ ¼ B e1ð Þ ð1Þ
W e2je1;λð Þ ¼ B e2ð Þ−λC e1 þ e2ð Þ; ð2Þ
where
B0N0;B″b0;C0N0;C″N0:
The function B(e) denotes known short-run beneﬁts from industrial
processes that emit the pollutant, and C(e1+ e2) denotes long-run costs
(e.g. health impacts or productivity losses) resulting from the accumu-
lation of the pollutant in the atmosphere. Themagnitude of these future
costs is uncertain, and depends on the realization of λ.
Returning to our general model exposition, we assume that
λ ∈ {λL, λH}, where λL b λH. The crucial feature of our model is that
parties and voters have heterogeneous beliefs about the consequences
of policy choices. In the ﬁrst period, party i believes that λ= λL with
prior probability qi. We assume without loss of generality that qG b qB.
In our environmental example, this implies that the Green party puts
more subjective weight on the ‘high damages’ state λ= λH than the
Brown party — hence their labels. The voting population's beliefs
are also heterogeneous, and each party's beliefs are assumed to berepresentative of some exogenously given subset of voters. The hetero-
geneity in the parties' beliefs is the only difference between them.
Party i's expected utility in the second period, given beliefs qi, is:
A e2je1; qið Þ :¼ qiW e2je1;λLð Þ þ 1−qið ÞW e2je1;λHð Þ; ð3Þ
and we deﬁne
A e1; qð Þ :¼ max
e2≥0
qW e2je1;λLð Þ þ 1−qð ÞW e2je1;λHð Þ½  ð4Þ
e2 e1; qð Þ :¼ argmax qW e2je1;λLð Þ þ 1−qð ÞW e2je1;λHð Þ½ : ð5Þ
A∗(e1, q) is thus the payoff a party with beliefs q expects to receive in
the secondperiod if the value of λ remains unknown in the future, and it
has exclusive control over which second period policy is implemented.
e2
∗(e1, q) is the policy this party would choose in this situation.
Similarly, if the value of λ is known for sure, both parties will agree
that second period payoffs are given by
W e1;λð Þ :¼ max
e2≥0
W e2je1;λð Þ: ð6Þ
The parties are dogmatic, in that they do what they think is best for
the voters given their beliefs qi, and don't account for the beliefs of those
who disagree with them when making their policy choices. They are
however rational, and realize that in the future new observations may
be realized that provide information about the value of λ. They will in-
terpret this new evidence in a rational Bayesian fashion, and update
their priors. Moreover, each party knows that the other party will do
the same. We compress this incremental learning process into a single
period.
To keep the learning process simple we assume that in the second
period either the true value of λ is revealed (with probability f(e1)), or
nothing is learned about the value of λ (with probability 1− f(e1)).4
Crucially, we allow the probability of learning to depend on ﬁrst period
policies. If f′(e1) N 0 then learning is active— themore intensive are ﬁrst
period policies, the greater the chance of learning the value of λ in the
second period. In this case, policy experimentation carries an informa-
tional payoff. Alternatively, if f′(e1) = 0, we say that learning is passive:
policy choices have no informational consequences.
Fig. 1 illustrates the timing of events in the model. At the beginning
of the ﬁrst period an incumbent chooses a policy e1. At the end of the
ﬁrst period either the true value of λ is revealed (with probability
f(e1)), or nothing is learned (with probability 1− f(e1)). If λ is revealed,
the parties' policy preferences are identical in the second period— there
is no difference between them as they hold the same beliefs. In
this branch of the decision tree there is a ‘trivial’ election in the second
period— it doesn't matter who gets elected, as both parties will choose
the same policy. If however λ is not revealed, the parties' beliefs remain
divergent in the second period. In this case even though the parties have
common objectives, they offer different platforms, reﬂecting their
different priors. Thus each party announces a policy platform e2i at the
beginning of the second period, and voters decide between them in
competitive elections.
We assume for the moment that parties commit to their announced
platforms in the secondperiod. The case of no commitment can be treat-
ed as a special case of this general setup—we pursue this in Section 4.2
below. Since voters believe that parties commit, parties will announce
platforms that balance the (subjective) expected beneﬁts of the policy
Fig. 1. Timing of events in the model.
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offer compromise platforms. We model this electoral game using
the Wittman model of political competition (Wittman, 1973, 1983;
Roemer, 2001). Under this model, party i's problem is to maximize
its payoff Pi(e2i, e2j|e1) with respect to e2i, taking e2j as given, where:
Pi e2i; e2 jje1
 
¼ πi e2i; e2 j
 
A e2ije1; qið Þ þ 1−πi e2i; e2 j
  
A e2 jje1; qi
 
;
ð7Þ
and i ≠ j ∈ {G, B}. The function πi(e2i, e2j) = 1 − πj(e2j, e2i) is the
probability of party i being elected when platforms e2i, e2j are an-
nounced. This function will be determined by the distribution of be-
liefs about λ in the voting population, and a model of voter behavior
which maps each of the voter's beliefs into a vote choice, given a pair
of announced platforms. For example, a voter with beliefs qmay vote
for the party whose platform is closest to what she believes to be the
optimal policy, i.e. e2∗(e1, q). In the interest of generality we leave the
precise nature of voter behavior, and hence the election probability,
unspeciﬁed at this stage, but consider a speciﬁc model in Section 4. It
is clear from (7) that parties face a tradeoff between increasing their
chance of being elected (π) and having their policy enacted, and
choosing a policy that maximizes their expected payoff (A).
Roemer (2001) ﬁnds conditions that ensure the existence of a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium to the political game with payoffs (7). These
conditions will always be satisﬁed for the speciﬁcations of π(e2i, e2j)
we consider in Section 4 below, and uniqueness is guaranteed as well
for these models. We denote the value of the second period electoral
game to party i ∈ {G, B} by
P^i e1ð Þ :¼ Pi e^2i; e^2 jje1
 
ð8Þ
where we use the ^ symbol to denote optimized quantities that depend
on the political equilibrium. The equilibrium platforms e^2i; e^2 j will also
depend on e1 in general. This reﬂects the linkage between the two
time periods due to the long run consequences of ﬁrst period decisions.
Note that
P^i e1ð Þ≤ A e1; qið Þ: ð9ÞThis follows from (7), which shows that P^
i
e1ð Þ is a convex combina-
tion of two terms, each of which is less than or equal to A∗(e1, qi). Thus
any incumbent party's payoff is lower when it faces political competi-
tion than when it is certain to be in power in the second period. This
is a consequence of the loss of control induced by competitive elections.
Summing up all the learning and political components of themodel,
the optimal ﬁrst period policy of an incumbent party i is
e^1i :¼ argmaxe1≥0½U e1ð Þ þ f e1ð Þ qiW e1;λLð Þ þ 1−qið ÞW e1;λHð Þ
 
þ 1− f e1ð Þð ÞP^i e1ð Þ;
ð10Þ
where as before the * symbol denotes an optimized quantity that is in-
dependent of political competition.
3. Effect of political competition and active learning onpolicy choice
Our main hypothesis is that the interaction between active learning
and political competition gives rise to incentives for incumbents to ‘over
experiment’ with their ﬁrst period policies. This reduces uncertainty
and disagreement in the future, and hence avoids costly political com-
petition. In order to demonstrate this in ourmodel, we need to examine
the additional effects of active learning, political competition, and their
interaction, on policy choice. Thus, we need to deﬁne baseline learning
and political scenarios which we will compare to the active learning/
political competition scenarios.
To this end, we deﬁne a passive learning scenario, in which ﬁrst
period policies have no effect on the probability of learning the value
of λ (i.e. f′(e1)= 0), and an active learning scenario, in which increasing
e1 increases the chance of learning the value of λ (i.e. f′(e1) N 0):
Passive learning : f e1ð Þ ¼ f 0; a constant ð11Þ
Active learning : f e1ð Þ ¼ f 0 þ f a e1ð Þ ð12Þ
where f a 0ð Þ ¼ 0; f 0a e1ð ÞN0; lime1→∞ f a e1ð Þ≤1− f 0. In the active learning
case fa(e1) represents the additional information that is revealed by
Table 1
Notation for our four policy scenarios.
Passive learning Active learning
Individual optimum e1∗0 e1∗a
Political competition e^01 e^
a
1
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resolving uncertainty f0. By comparing optimal policies under active
learning to optimal policies under passive learning, we will capture
the additional effect of the active component of learning fa(e1) on policy
choice.
In order to isolate the effects of political competition on ﬁrst period
choices in these two learning scenarios, we will contrast the optimal
ﬁrst period decision under political competition with a baseline
case in which the incumbent is guaranteed to be in power in both
periods — we refer to this as the individual optimum case. In this case,
the optimal ﬁrst period policy of the incumbent i ∈ {G, B} is given by
e1i :¼ argmaxe1≥0½U e1ð Þ þ f e1ð Þ qiW e1;λLð Þ þ 1−qið ÞW e1;λHð Þ
 
þ 1− f e1ð Þð ÞA e1; qið Þ:
ð13Þ
The difference between (13) and (10) is that the value of the ‘no
learning’ branch of the decision tree is now given by A∗(e1, qi), rather
than P^
i
e1ð Þ.
We have thus set up two dimensions of variation in our model —
passive vs. active learning, and political competition vs. the individual
optimum. Evaluating the optimal policies in (10) and (13) under the
two learning scenarios (11) and (12) leads to four policy scenarios.
Table 1 summarizes our notation for the optimal ﬁrst period policies
in these four cases.
The passive learning/individual optimum cases allow us to deter-
mine the additional effects of active learning/political competition, rela-
tive to these baselines. The interaction between active learning and
political competition is captured by looking for differences between
the effect of active learning (relative to passive learning) in the two
different political scenarios.
Comparing policies in the same column in Table 1 gives us the effect
of political competition on the optimal policy choices of an incumbent.
When learning is passive this effect is captured by e01 −e^
0
1. When learn-
ing is active the effect is captured by ea1 −e^
a
1. Similarly, comparing poli-
cies in the same row in Table 1 gives us the effect of active learning. This
effect is captured by e1∗0− e1∗a in the individual optimum, and by e^01−e^
a
1
under political competition.5
3.1. A simple model with binary policy options
In order to build intuition, we consider a simple version of the above
model in which the ﬁrst period policy e1 can take only two values:
e1 ∈ {0, 1}.6 The incumbent must either implement a policy (e1 = 1),
or do nothing (e1 = 0) in the ﬁrst period. Second period policies e2
may be discrete or continuous— all that we require is that optimal sec-
ond period policies e2∗(e1, q) depend on the value of q.
Our main result in this case is as follows:5 Our speciﬁcation of learning means that the incumbent learns more under active
learning than under passive learning for any e1 N 0. As we show below, this may make
the absolute level of e1 under active learning greater than under passive learning, since in-
creasing e1 carries additional informational beneﬁts. However, our core results are about
differences in policy choices across political scenarios, given a learning scenario, anddiffer-
ences in these differences. Our focus is thus on the interaction between policy experimen-
tation and political competition, and not on the effects of active learning in isolation.
6 This simple case is an adaptation of the classic model of Arrow and Fisher (1974),
which analyses the effect of learning and irreversibility on intertemporal choice, to our po-
litical context. Note however that irreversibility plays no role in our analysis.Proposition 1. Active learning gives any incumbent party an additional
incentive to experiment (i.e. choose e1= 1) relative to the passive learning
case, in both the individual optimum and political competition scenarios.
However, this additional incentive is greater under political competition
than in the individual optimum.
Proof. Let Y^ i e1ð Þ be the value of policy e1 under political competition,
and Yi∗(e1) the value of policy e1 in the individual optimum, for party i.
Let f1 = f(1), and f0 = f(0), where f1 N f0 when learning is active, and
f1 N f0 when learning is passive.
From (10) we have that in general
Y^ i 1ð Þ−Y^ i 0ð Þ ¼ U 1ð Þ−U 0ð Þ þ f 1EiW 1;λð Þ− f 0EiW 0;λð Þ
þ 1− f 1ð ÞP^i 1ð Þ− 1− f 0ð ÞP^i 0ð Þ ð14Þ
where Ei denotes an expectation over λ ∈ {λL, λH} with probability
distribution (qi, 1− qi). The incumbent chooses e1 = 1 if and only if Y^ i
1ð Þ−Y^ i 0ð ÞN0. We will refer to the quantity Y^ i 1ð Þ−Y^ i 0ð Þ as the ‘relative
beneﬁts’ of e1=1. Deﬁne the difference between the relative beneﬁts of
e1 = 1 under active and passive learning as:
Δ^i :¼ Y^ i 1ð Þ−Y^ i 0ð Þ
h i
f 1 N f 0
− Y^ i 1ð Þ−Y^ i 0ð Þ
h i
f 1¼ f 0
¼ f 1− f 0ð ÞEiW 1;λð Þ− f 1− f 0ð ÞP^i 1ð Þ≥0
ð15Þ
Δ^i measures the additional incentive to choose e1 = 1 (rather than
e1 = 0) when learning is active, over and above the incentive to choose
e1 = 1 when learning is passive. The fact that Δ^i≥0 follows from
EiW 1;λð Þ ¼ Ei max
e2
W e2j1;λð Þ≥ maxe2 E
iW e2j1;λð Þ ¼ A 1; qið Þ≥ P^i 1ð Þ:
The ﬁrst of these inequalities follows from the convexity of the ‘max’
function (information has positive value), and the second from (9).
Thus there is a greater incentive to choose e1 = 1 when learning is ac-
tive than when it is passive when the incumbent faces political compe-
tition in the future.
Repeating this calculation in the individual optimum case, one ﬁnds
that:
Δi :¼ Yi 1ð Þ−Yi 0ð Þ
 
f 1 N f 0
− Yi 1ð Þ−Yi 0ð Þ
 
f 1¼ f 0
¼ f 1− f 0ð ÞEiW 1;λð Þ− f 1− f 0ð ÞA 1; qið Þ≥0:
ð16Þ
Similarly, there is a greater incentive to choose e1 = 1 under active
learning (relative to passive learning) when the incumbent is certain
to be in ofﬁce in both periods.
Finally, we show that the interaction between active learning and
political competition gives rise to an additional incentive for the incum-
bent to choose e1 = 1, relative to the individual optimum. This is dem-
onstrated by the fact that the ‘difference in differences’ between the
effects of active learning in the two political scenarios is:
Δ^i−Δ

i ¼ f 1− f 0ð Þ A 1; qið Þ−P^i 1ð Þ
h i
≥0: ð17Þ
This result says that the difference between the incumbent's incen-
tive to choose e1 = 1 under active vs. passive learning is larger when
it faces political competition than in its individual optimum. There will
thus be cases inwhich switching frompassive to active learning induces
the incumbent to switch from e1 = 0 to e1 = 1 under political competi-
tion, but not in the individual optimum. The converse, however, can
never happen. If a switch from passive to active learning causes the
incumbent party to change from e1 = 0 to e1 = 1 in the individual
optimum, it must also do so under political competition.
This simple result illustrates the incentive for the incumbent party to
over experiment when it faces political competition from an opponent
who shares its goals, but has differing beliefs. While active learning
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e1 = 1 policy under both political scenarios, the difference between
the relative beneﬁts of e1 = 1 under active and passive learning is
greater under political competition than in the individual optimum.
This is so since, under active learning, the incumbent party increases
its chance of avoiding an election with an opponent different from it-
self by choosing e1 = 1. It chooses its ﬁrst period policy strategically
to reduce disagreement in the second period. This result relies criti-
cally on the fact that the parties have heterogeneous beliefs. Beliefs
are endogenous and amenable to manipulation, whereas preference
parameters are not.
3.2. Continuous ﬁrst period policies
The positive interaction between active learning and political
competition is easily demonstrated in the binary case examined in
Section 3.1. We now extend these results to a continuous model of
policy choice. This turns out to be a more complex problem, for the
following reason. The results we obtained in the binary model only
required us to rank payoff levels under the different scenarios. When
ﬁrst period policies e1 are continuous (and payoffs W are non-linear
in e1), the comparison between optimal ﬁrst period policies under dif-
ferent learning and political scenarios involves not only the levels of
second period payoffs, but also the derivatives of these payoffs with
respect to e1.
This additional complexity has long been recognized in the literature
on the effect of learning on dynamic choice (e.g. Epstein, 1980;Ulph and
Ulph, 1997; Gollier et al., 2000), which has focussed on conditions that
are sufﬁcient to determine the direction of the change in the optimal
choice variable under different learning scenarios. Following in this tra-
dition, wewill state sufﬁcient conditions for an analogue of the intuitive
results obtained in the binary case to hold in a continuous model.
Reconsidering the models of the incumbent's ﬁrst period choices in
(10) and (13), we now assume that e1 is a continuous choice variable.
Our sufﬁciency result is as follows:
Proposition 2. Suppose that ﬁrst period payoffs U(e1) are concave in e1,
and that unique interior solutions to the ﬁrst order conditions exist under
all the scenarios in Table 1. If for all e1 and qi
dA e1; qið Þ
de1
≥ dP^
i e1ð Þ
de1
ð18Þ7 This is a trivial consequence of the conclusions of Proposition 2. Compare e^a1−e^
0
1 to e1
∗a−
e1
∗0. Both quantities are positive by conclusion (a). e^a1 Ne
a
1 by conclusion (c), and e^
0
1≤e01 by
conclusion (b). Hence e^a1−e^
0
1 Ne
a
1 −e01 .dA e1; qið Þ
de1
≤qi
dW e1;λLð Þ
de1
þ 1−qið Þ
dW e1;λHð Þ
de1
; ð19Þ
then for any incumbent i,
(a) Active learning increases e1 (relative to passive learning) in the in-
dividual optimum, and under political competition: ea1 Ne
0
1 ; e^
a
1N e^
0
1.
(b) Under passive learning, political competition either decreases e1
(relative to the individual optimum), or has no effect on e1: e^
0
1≤e01 .
(c) Under active learning, for any f(e1) that satisﬁes
− d
de1
log 1− f e1ð Þð Þ≥
d
de1
log A e1; qið Þ−P^i e1ð Þ
 
for all e1; qi;
ð20Þ
political competition increases e1 (relative to the individual
optimum): e^a1Ne
a
1 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
When the conditions of the proposition hold, active learning in-
creases e1 (relative to passive learning) in both political scenarios, but
increases it more when the incumbent party faces political competitionthanwhen it is certain to remain in power.7 The incentive to experiment
is thus stronger when the incumbent faces political competition.
To understand the conditions in the proposition, it is helpful to begin
by examining a special case. Suppose thatW(e2|e1, λ) is independent of
e1. In this case the only way e1 inﬂuences second period payoffs is
through the effect it has on the probability of learning f(e1); it does
not directly affect the parties' payoffs in the second period. Thus the
only linkage between the periods is informational. In this case the
conditions (18–19) are satisﬁed as equalities as their constituent
terms are all identically zero, and condition (20) is satisﬁed for any
strictly increasing f(e1), as its right hand side is zero. Thus the conclu-
sions of the proposition hold identically in this case (with political com-
petition having no effect on e1 under passive learning in conclusion (b)).
The only information that is necessary to deduce the conclusions of
the proposition in this special case is the following set of inequalities,
which always hold:
P^i e1ð ÞbA e1; qið ÞbqiW e1;λLð Þ þ 1−qið ÞW e1;λHð Þ: ð21Þ
In words, second period payoffs under political competition when λ
is unknown are always less than payoffs in the individual optimum
when λ is unknown, which are in turn always less than payoffs when
λ is known in the second period. These relationships imply the pattern
of effects we observed in the binary policy case (we used them in
(15–17)), and these effects carry over to the continuous policy case
when information is the only linkage between the two periods. The
core insight is that in this special case our intuition for how the interac-
tion between active learning and political competition, which was
based on comparisons of the levels of payoffs under different scenarios,
is undisturbed by the derivatives of payoffs.
Now consider the more general, empirically relevant, case in which
ﬁrst period policies affect secondperiod payoffs directly. This introduces
new terms into the ﬁrst order conditions, all of which depend on the de-
rivatives of second period payoffs with respect to e1. If we are to obtain
similar results in this casewe need these additional derivative terms not
to disturb the ranking of policies based on comparisons of the levels
of the payoffs under different learning/political scenarios, as in (21).
Notice that we can combine the conditions (18–19) and write them as:
d
de1
P^i e1ð Þ≤
d
de1
A e1; qið Þ≤
d
de1
qiW
 e1;λLð Þ þ 1−qið ÞW e1;λHð Þ
 
: ð22Þ
Comparing these inequalities to those in (21), we see that the con-
clusions of Proposition 2 hold if the derivatives of second period payoffs
with respect to e1 are ranked in the same way as the levels of the
payoffs.
The conditions (18) and (19) are the crucial conditions of
Proposition 2. When they are satisﬁed, there always exist active learn-
ing functions fa(e1) such that (20) holds. In the general case however,
we need learning to be ‘active enough’ to offset the other derivative
terms that appear when comparing the individual optimum and politi-
cal competition cases under active learning. This is the origin of the
condition (20), which requires the rate of decrease of 1 − f(e1) to be
larger than the rate of increase of A e1; qið Þ−P^
i
e1ð Þ as a function of e1.
Put another way, it requires f(e1) to increase fast enough to offset the
difference in the marginal effect of a change in e1 between the two po-
litical scenarios. Formal details of these arguments can be found in
Appendix A.
While the message of the proposition is clear, the conditions
(18–19) depend on endogenous quantities, and it is thus not possible
to know when they are satisﬁed without putting more structure on
the problem. This is a common feature of learning models (see e.g.
9 Themedian voter equilibrium is also the equilibrium that would result if parties max-
imized their probability of election, and not their idiosyncratic expected payoffs as in (7).
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political competition, and, in each, ﬁnd primitive conditions on the pay-
off functionW(e1|e2, λ) that ensure that the crucial conditions (18–19)
hold.
4. Specifying the model of political competition
In this section we specialize to a speciﬁc model of voter behavior,
which allows us to determine the probability of election in (7). This
framework leads to simple expressions for equilibrium election
platforms, which in turn allow us to write down an analytic expression
for P^
i
e1ð Þ, the equilibrium value of the ‘no learning’ sub-game.
In the model we consider, the voters' choices depend only on the
platforms parties announce (i.e. they don't have a party afﬁliation),
and the distribution of their beliefs is known to both parties.We consid-
er two variants of the model — a full commitment case, and a no
commitment case — and show that the same primitive conditions
on the payoff function W(e2|e1, λ) imply that the conditions of
Proposition 2 are satisﬁed in both cases.
4.1. A median voter model (full commitment)
In order to pin down the nature of the political competition parties
face we have to specify the probability of election function πi(e2i, e2j)
in (7). In this variant of the model we assume as before that voters be-
lieve that parties commit to any announced policy platform. Recall
that q denotes a subjective belief that the realized value of λ will be λL.
We assume that there is a distribution of voters with different values
of q in the population, and denote the cumulative distribution function
for q by F(q). As before, the parties' beliefs are exogenously given, and
are assumed to be representative of the beliefs of different groups of
voters.8 πi(e2i, e2j), the probability of party i winning the election
when the announced platforms are (e2i, e2j), is modeled through:
πi e2i; e2 j
 
¼
1 if Γ e2i; e2 j
 
N0:5
0:5 if Γ e2i; e2 j
 
¼ 0:5
0 if Γ e2i; e2 j
 
b0:5
8>><>>: ð23Þ
where
Γ e2i; e2 j
 
:¼ F q : A e2ije1; qð ÞNA e2 jje1; q
 n o 
ð24Þ
is the measure of the set of voters who prefer policy e2i to policy e2j.
Thus, each voter simply chooses the party whose platform gives her a
higher expected utility, and the election is decided by majority rule.
With this speciﬁcation for πi(e2i, e2j), the following lemma holds:
Lemma 1. Assume that W(e2|e1, λ) is a single-peaked function of e2. Let
the median voter's beliefs be qm = F−1(1/2), and assume that
qG b qm b qB. Then the equilibrium outcome of the political game in which
parties' payoffs are given by (7), and the probability of election is given
by (23), is that both parties propose the optimal policy of the median
voter, e2∗(e1, qm). Thus the value of the electoral game to party i is given by
P^i e1ð Þ ¼ A e2 e1; qmð Þje1; qi
 
: ð25Þ8 This does not imply that all voters a party aims to represent will vote for that party.
Parties can announce only one platform, and thus cannot ensure that all the voters it aims
to represent will prefer that platform to the other platform on offer.Proof. See Appendix B.
Thus when voters' beliefs are known and they have single peaked
preferences, parties' platforms converge completely in the second
period — they both offer the median voter's optimal policy.9
With this expression for the equilibrium value of the ‘no learning’
sub-game, we can seek conditions on the payoff function W which
ensure that (18–19) of Proposition 2 are satisﬁed. The next result
provides such conditions, without specifying a parametric form forW.
Let subscripts on functions denote partial derivatives, e.g.W2 ¼ ∂W∂e2;
W2λ ¼ ∂2W∂e2∂λ . Assume the following conditions on the second period
welfare functionW(e2|e1, da):
W22b0 ð26Þ
W21b0 ð27Þ
W2λb0: ð28Þ
(26) is the standard concavity condition, and in addition we assume
that solutions to the second period optimization problemare interior, so
that the constraint e2≥ 0 is not binding. This assumption simpliﬁes our
analysis, but our results are not crucially dependent on it. It is readily
shown (see Appendix C) that the conditions (27) and (28) imply re-
spectively that the optimal second period policy e2∗(e1, q), is decreasing
in e1, and increasing in q. In our environmental example this implies
that the greater is the level of ﬁrst period emissions, the less parties
want to emit in the second period, and similarly, the greater the weight
they put on the low damages state λL, themore theywant to emit in the
second period.
Now deﬁne
ϵxjy :¼ Elasticity of W2x with respect to y: ð29Þ
Proposition 3. If U is concave, (26–28) hold, the probability of election
π(e2i, e2j) is given by (23), and
ϵ2j2≥ϵ1j2 ð30Þ
ϵ1jλNϵ2jλ ð31Þ
then both the conditions (18) and (19) of Proposition 2 hold.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The conditions on the elasticities ϵx|y in this proposition clearly
require investigation. To ﬁx ideas however, it may be useful to see
what they imply for the simple functional form for W in (2). Substitu-
tion of (2) into (30) and (31) shows that these two conditions reduce to
−B
‴
B″
≤−C
‴
C″
; ð32Þ
B″b0 ð33ÞThis was demonstrated in the classic work of Downs (1957). However, although the equi-
librium in theWittmanmodelwith probability of election given by (23) coincideswith the
Downsian equilibrium, parties' valuations of the equilibrium differ in ourmodel, as shown
in (25), whereas they coincide in the Downsian model. We consider a model of political
competition that also permits divergence between parties' equilibrium platforms in
Section 4.2.
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C′ to be more concave than their marginal beneﬁts B′. The second
condition is satisﬁed by assumption. Notice that both conditions are
always satisﬁed in the textbook case of linear marginal beneﬁt and
cost functions.
A core consequence of the elasticity conditions (30–31), which aids
in their interpretation, is that they imply that second period optimal
policies e2∗(e1, q) have an ‘increasing differences’ property:
d2e2
de1dq
N0: ð34Þ
This is a Spence-Mirrlees sorting condition, which allows us to use
beliefs q as an index that tells us howmuch a change in e1 affects second
period optimal policies e2∗(e1, q). Recall that (27) implies that
de2
de1
b0. Thus
(34) says that the higher q is (i.e. the more weight on λL), the less e2∗ is
reduced when e1 is increased.
This property has important consequences for the condition (18),
which gives rise to conclusion (b) of Proposition 1: under passive learn-
ing any incumbent reduces e1 under political competition relative to its
individual optimum. This is really thenovel condition of the proposition,
as the other condition (19), which guarantees that active learning
causes incumbents to increase e1 relative to passive learning, is well
known; it can be seen as a special case of the sufﬁcient conditions for
signing the effect of learning on policy choice derived in Epstein
(1980). Conclusion (b) is novel, so it is important to understand how
the properties of the payoff function in Proposition 3 give rise to it.
This can be seen by thinking about the strategic consequences of (34)
in the political competition scenario, as we now explain.
Since qG b qm b qB, we know from (34) that,
d
de1
e2 e1; qmð Þ−e2 e1; qGð Þ
 
N0 ð35Þ
d
de1
e2 e1; qBð Þ−e2 e1; qmð Þ
 
N0: ð36Þ
Now by the monotonicity of e2∗(e1, q) in q, we also know that
e2 e1; qmð Þ−e2 e1; qGð ÞN0 ð37ÞFig. 2. Strategic interactions between the ﬁrst period choices of an incumbent and the sec-
ond period choices of themedian voter. The condition d
2e2
de1dq
N0 implies that for any δ N 0, the
curves e2∗(e1+ δ, q), e2∗(e1, q) and e2∗(e1− δ, q) as functions of q are ordered as in the ﬁgure
above. Increasing e1 relative to the individual optimum of the incumbent party increases
the difference between the second period optima of themedian voter and the incumbent,
regardless of whether the incumbent's q is above or below themedian value qm. However,
decreasing e1 relative to the incumbent's individual optimum brings the median voter's
second period optimum closer to the incumbent's, regardless of the incumbent's beliefs.e2 e1; qBð Þ−e2 e1; qmð ÞN0: ð38Þ
Thus from the inequalities (35–36) and (37–38), we see that if we
increase e1, the distance between the median voter's optimum and
either parties' optimum increases. However, reducing e1 brings theme-
dian voters' optimum closer to both of the parties' individual optima.
Since it is themedian voters' optimum that is implemented under polit-
ical competition, and all parties have single peaked preferences over
second period policies, all parties want this policy to be as close to
their individual optima as possible. Fig. 2 illustrates this intuition
graphically.
The condition (34) thus ensures that regardless of whether the
incumbent party's beliefs qi are greater or less than qm, it always has a
strategic incentive to reduce e1 relative to its individual optimum.
4.2. Exogenous election probabilities (no commitment)
In this section we replace the model of political competition in
Section 4.1, in which the probability of election πi(e2i, e2j) is determined
endogenously, with amodel inwhich πi is an exogenous parameter that
is independent of the parties' platforms. It is readily seen that in this
case the parties' equilibrium platforms will coincide with their individ-
ually optimal policies. Such a model arises naturally if parties cannot
commit to their election platforms. This is the case examined in models
of strategic policymanipulationwith heterogenous preference parame-
ters by Persson and Svensson (1989) and Aghion and Bolton (1990). In
this case all voters know that the partieswill implement their individual
optima after the election has occurred, and thus the electoral outcome
is determined by which individual optimum is more appealing to the
median voter:
πi ¼
1 if A e2 e1; qið Þje1; qm
 
NA e2 e1; qj
 e1; qm 
0:5 if A e2 e1; qið Þje1; qm
  ¼ A e2 e1; qj e1; qm 
0 if A e2 e1; qið Þje1; qm
 
bA e2 e1; qj
 e1; qm 
8>><>>: : ð39Þ
We can treat all these cases at once by allowing the probability of
election to be an arbitrary constant. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Suppose that the conditions on U and W in Proposition 3
are satisﬁed.Assume that the outcome of the political process is exogenously
determined, so that πi(e2i, e2j) is an arbitrary constant in [0, 1]. Then the
conclusions of Proposition 3 continue to hold.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Thus the results in Section 4.1, in which the election outcome was
endogenously determined by the parties' platforms and parties were
assumed to commit, carry over to the case in which election outcomes
are exogenous (independent of the parties' platforms) and parties
cannot commit.
5. Applications
The mechanism we have identiﬁed can be applied in many policy
contexts. Before we discuss some examples however, we emphasize
that we see the effect we have highlighted as only a partial contributing
factor to actual policy outcomes. Our purpose has been to highlight an
informational channel of intertemporal inﬂuence and its effects on the
policy choices of incumbents. The model is intentionally idealized, in
order to demonstrate the new incentives for policy manipulation that
belief heterogeneity gives rise to. Previous literature (e.g. Persson and
Svensson, 1989; Aghion and Bolton, 1990) examines strategic policy
choice when parties' objectives are heterogeneous but they have com-
mon beliefs; our work assumes the opposite. The real world, of course,
falls between these two stark cases.
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case of public smoking bans. The beneﬁts of reducing second-hand
smoke include lowering the risk of lung cancer, reducing health care
costs, and improving worker productivity. The costs of bans are born
by restaurants and bars who may see a decline in proﬁts. These costs
are uncertain before the policy has been implemented. Indeed, the im-
pacts of smoking bans on the restaurant business are still debated
(Hyland et al., 1999; Adams and Cotti, 2007). Given this uncertainty,
and conﬂicting sources of information, different public representatives
are likely to hold different beliefs about the consequences of these
laws. Despite conﬂicting views, public ofﬁcials have proven willing to
experiment with smoking bans, as their diffusion from a few cities and
states (San Luis Obispo, California in 1990, California in 1998, New
York City in 2002) to many states and countries illustrates (Adams
and Cotti, 2007; Eriksen and Chaloupka, 2007).
Congestion charges provide another application. These taxes provide
an immediate social beneﬁt by reducing trafﬁc congestion and improv-
ing air quality in city centers. However, they also impose a priori uncer-
tain costs on residents who commute to the city center by car, and
hence on centrally located retail businesses. Despite disagreements
about the projected impacts of these policies, city administrations
have rolled them out. The charges are usually introduced in an initial
experimental phase, which enables affected parties to learn about
their consequences. This occurred in Stockholm in 2007, when the
charge was implemented for an initial seven month trial period, before
being expanded and made permanent (Winslott-Hiselius et al., 2009).
Similarly, the London congestion charge in 2003 was adopted after an
18-month public consultation period (Leape, 2006).
A further example is provided by policies that aim to regulate
national emissions of atmospheric pollutants. Policies that place an
annual cap on emissions, such as the cap-and-trade mechanisms of
the US Acid Rain Program (established in 1990 to curtail sulfur dioxide
and nitrogen oxide emissions), or the European Emissions Trading
Scheme (established in 2005 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions),
may reduce the future damages that arise from the accumulation of pol-
lutants. However, different political actors hold different beliefs about
the magnitude of these damages, which are highly uncertain (Borick
and Rabe, 2012). Since forcing the atmospheric system with emissions
allows us to observe how it responds, emitting more today helps to
reduce uncertainty in the future (Kelly et al., 2005). Thus our model
suggests that even well-intentioned incumbents have an incentive to
set less stringent caps than theywould prefer to, so as reduce uncertain-
ty and disagreement in the future. Unlike more conventional explana-
tions of the difﬁculty of passing stringent abatement policies, which
appeal to partisanmotives, collective action problems, and the inﬂuence
of special interest groups, this explanation does not require political
parties to act solely in their self-interest; it is simply a consequence of
disagreements about matters of fact.
6. Conclusions
Our analysis has identiﬁed a novel incentive for incumbents to
manipulate their policy choices, when beliefs are the primary source
of disagreement between political parties. This stems from the interac-
tion between active learning — the ability to endogenously inﬂuence
future information revelation through current policy choices — and
political competition. When learning is active incumbents can control
the degree of disagreement in the future. Since the incumbent party
avoids a costly election with an opponent very different from itself if
information is revealed and beliefs converge, it has an incentive to
increase the chances of resolving uncertainty in the future, regardless
of its initial beliefs. This effect relies crucially on the fact that, unlike in-
trinsic preference parameters, beliefs are endogenous, and thus subject
to manipulation.
The mechanism we identify is widely applicable, and may have
explanatory power for any policy issue about which voters and partieshave diverse beliefs, and where learning occurs through policy imple-
mentation. Unlike conventional explanations of distortions to public
good provision due to the inﬂuence of politics, our result does not rely
on rent-seeking and the inﬂuence of special interest groups (Aidt and
Dutta, 2007; Bohn, 2007; Battaglini and Coate, 2008), or the institutional
structure of government (Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Lizzeri and
Persico, 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). It can be thought of as
a parsimonious causal mechanism that assumes the best of political
actors, yet predicts that they will still do more to reduce uncertainty
than they would like to.
Appendix A. Proof of proposition 2
To prove this result it will be useful to deﬁne two operators. For any
functional Y(f) of the probability of learning f(e1), deﬁne
ΓLY fð Þ :¼ Y f 0ð Þ−Y f 0 þ f a e1ð Þð Þ: ð40Þ
This operator captures the change in Ywhen we move from passive
learning (f(e1) = f0) to active learning (f(e1) = f0 + fa(e1)) — the
subscript L stands for ‘Learning’. Similarly, for any functional Y P^
i 
that depends on the political equilibrium value function P^
i
e1ð Þ, deﬁne
ΓPY P^
i
 
:¼ Y A e1; qið Þ
 
−Y P^i e1ð Þ
 
: ð41Þ
This quantity represents the change in Ywhenwemove from the in-
dividual optimum, inwhich second period payoffs are given by A∗(e1, qi)
when learning does not occur, to political competition, where ‘no learn-
ing’ second period payoffs are given by P^
i
e1ð Þ. The subscript P stands for
‘Politics’.
The ﬁrst order condition associated with the deﬁnition of e^1i in (10),
which determines the optimal policies under political competition, can
be written as
U0 e1ð Þ ¼ Φ^i e1ð Þ ð42Þ
where
Φ^i e1ð Þ :¼ f 0 e1ð Þ P^i e1ð Þ−qiW e1;λLð Þ− 1−qið ÞW e1;λHð Þ
h i
− dP^
i e1ð Þ
de1
þ f e1ð Þ
dP^i e1ð Þ
de1
−qi
dW e1;λLð Þ
de1
− 1−qið Þ
dW e1;λHð Þ
de1
" #
:
ð43Þ
Similarly, the ﬁrst order condition associated with the deﬁnition of
e1i
∗ in (13), which determines the optimal policies in the individual
optimum, can be written as
U0 e1ð Þ ¼ Φi e1ð Þ ð44Þ
where
Φi e1ð Þ :¼ f 0 e1ð Þ A e1; qið Þ−qiW e1;λLð Þ− 1−qið ÞW e1;λHð Þ
 
−dA
 e1; qið Þ
de1
þ f e1ð Þ
dA e1; qið Þ
de1
−qi
dW e1;λLð Þ
de1
− 1−qið Þ
dW e1;λHð Þ
de1
	 

:
ð45Þ
Now assume that solutions to the ﬁrst order conditions for e1 in
Table 1 exist and are unique in all cases. Then for any function Φ,
ΓL Φð ÞN bð Þ0 ∀e1⇒ΓL e1ð Þb Nð Þ0: ð46Þ
Similarly, for any f,
ΓP Φð ÞN bð Þ0 ∀e1⇒ΓP e1ð Þb Nð Þ0: ð47Þ
Fig. 3. Effect of a change in the right hand side of the ﬁrst order conditions induced by
political competition on optimal ﬁrst period policies.
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tions to the ﬁrst order conditions (44) or (46), the left hand side is al-
ways given by the same decreasing function U′(e1). Thus, assuming
that unique solutions exist, if the sign of the difference in the right
hand sides, ΓL(Φ) or ΓP(Φ) as appropriate, is independent of e1, we are
able to infer the sign of the difference in optimal policies, as illustrated
by Fig. 3 in the case of ΓP(Φ).
From (44) and (46), it follows that
ΓL Φ^ e1ð Þ
 
¼−ef 0 e1ð Þ P^i e1ð Þ−qiW e1;λLð Þ− 1−qið ÞW e1;λHð Þh i
−ef e1ð Þ dP^i e1ð Þde1 −qi dW
 e1;λLð Þ
de1
− 1−qið Þ
dW e1;λHð Þ
de1
" #
ð48Þ
and
ΓL Φ
 e1ð Þ
  ¼−ef 0 e1ð Þ A e1; qð Þ−qW e1;λLð Þ− 1−qð ÞW e1;λHð Þ 
−ef e1ð Þ dA e1; qð Þde1 −q dW
 e1;λLð Þ
de1
− 1−qð ÞdW
 e1;λHð Þ
de1
	 

:
ð49Þ
Similarly, substitution from (47) and (45) shows that:
ΓP Φð Þ ¼ f 0 e1ð Þ A e1; qið Þ−P^i e1ð Þ
 
− 1− f e1ð Þð Þ
 dA e1; qið Þ=de1−dP^i e1ð Þ=de1
 
: ð50Þ
From this expression, we see that:
Passive learning : sgn ΓP Φð Þ½  ¼− sgn dA e1; qið Þ=de1−dP^i e1ð Þ=de1
h i
ð51Þ
Active learning : sgn ΓP Φð Þ½  ¼ sgn
f 0 e1ð Þ
1− f e1ð Þ
− dA
 e1; qið Þ=de1−dP^i e1ð Þ=de1
A e1; qið Þ−P^i e1ð Þ
" #
;
ð52Þ
where in the second line we have used the fact that A e1; qið Þ−P^i e1ð Þ is
always positive.
The three conclusions of the lemma are now arrived at as follows:
(a) Consider ΓL(e1∗), the effect of active learning on e1 in the indi-
vidual optimum, which is controlled by (51). By assumption,dA e1 ;qð Þ
de1
≤qdW e1 ;λLð Þde1 þ 1−qð ÞdW
 e1 ;λHð Þ
de1
, which means that the second
term in (51) is positive. It is also always true that
A e1; qð ÞbqW e1;λLð Þ þ 1−qð ÞW e1;λHð Þ: ð53Þ
This follows from the fact that A∗(e1, q) is the upper envelope of a
set of functions that is linear in (q, 1− q), and is thus convex in
this vector of probabilities (see e.g. Gollier, 2001, p. 359). It fol-
lows that ΓL(Φ∗(e1)) N 0, and hence ΓL(e1∗) b 0. Now consider ΓL
e^1ð Þ, the effect of active learning on e1 under political competi-
tion. This is controlled by ΓL Φ^ e1ð Þ
 
in Eq. (48). We know that
the ﬁrst term in this expression is positive since P^i e1ð ÞbA e1; qið Þ
bqiW
 e1;λLð Þ þ 1−qið ÞW e1;λHð Þ. By assumption,dP^i e1ð Þ=de1bd
A e1; qið Þ=de1≤qdW
 e1 ;λLð Þ
de1
þ 1−qð ÞdW e1 ;λHð Þde1 , so the second term in
(50) is also negative. Hence ΓL Φ^ e1ð Þ
 
N0, and ΓL e^1ð Þb0.
(b) Consider ΓP(e10), the effect of political competition on e1 under
passive learning, which is controlled by (53). The assumptiondP^i
e1ð Þ=de1bdA e1; qið Þ=de1 clearly implies that ΓP(Φ) b 0 in this
case, and hence ΓP(e10) N 0.
(c) Consider ΓP(e1a), the effect of political competition on e1 under
active learning, which is controlled by (54). From (54), we see
that ΓP(Φ) N 0, and hence ΓP(e1a) b 0, provided that the right
hand side of (54) is positive. This condition can be rearranged
to yield (20).
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 1
This result is an application of a theorem due to Roemer (2001).
Recall that in the second period, when no learning occurs, voters' pref-
erences are given by A(e2|e1, q), where e2 is the policy variable, and q
is the voters' type, which is distributed according to F(q) in the popula-
tion. We assume that the parties' payoffs are given by (7), with the
probability of election π given by (23), and the parties' values of q are
in {qG, qB}.
Theorem (Roemer, 2001) Assume that:
1. Voter preferences are continuous in q and e2.
2. Voter preferences are single peaked in e2 for all q.
3. The set of voters who are indifferent between any two policies e2 and e2′
has measure zero.
4. (Monotonicity) For every pair of policies e2 and e2′ where e2 b e2′,
there exists a policy e2
″ such that the set of voters who prefer e2 to
e2′ is equivalent to the set of voters whose optimal policies are less
than e2
″ .
5. Ψ(x), the set of voterswith optimal policies less than x, is continuous and
strictly increasing.
6. The median voter's optimal policy falls between the optimal policies of
the parties.
When conditions 1–6 are satisﬁed, the unique equilibrium of the game
in which the parties payoffs are given by (7) and the probability of election
π is given by (23) consists of both parties playing e2m := e2∗(e1, qm),where
qm satisﬁes F(qm) = 1/2.
We need to check that the conditions of this theoremare satisﬁed for
ourmodel. Condition 1 is satisﬁed by assumption for our function A, and
condition 2 follows from the assumption (26), i.e.W22 b 0. This implies
that titA is concave in e2, and we have assumed that an interior opti-
mum exists, hence A is single peaked in e2. Condition 3 means that the
distribution function F(q) is continuous on [0, 1], the space of types,
and is a mild technical restriction. Conditions 4–5 both rely on the fol-
lowing fact in our model: The optimal policy e2∗(e1, q) is a monotonic
(in fact increasing) function of q. We have guaranteed this by assump-
tion (i.e. the assumption W2λ b 0 ensures it). To show monotonicity
94 A. Millner et al. / Journal of Public Economics 120 (2014) 84–96(condition 4), consider twopolicies e2 and e2′, with e2 b e2′. A voter of type
q prefers the former to the latter iff:
A e02je1; q
 
NA e2je1; qð Þ⇒qW e2je01;λL
 
þ 1−qð ÞW e02je1;λH
 
NqW e2je1;λLð Þ
þ 1−qð ÞW e2je1;λHð Þ⇒qbN e2; e02
  ð54Þ
where N is a number which depends on the two policies. Now since the
optimal policy function e2∗(q) is increasing in q, we can write the condi-
tion q b N equivalently as e2∗(q) b e2∗(N). But this condition is exactly of
the form required for monotonicity, i.e. we have identiﬁed a policy
e2
∗(N) such that the set of voters who prefer e2 to e2′ is equivalent to all
those voters with optimal policies less than e2∗(N). Condition 5 follows
from assuming F(q) is continuous and that the optimal policies are
monotonic in q. Finally, Condition 6 requires qG b qm b qB, surely a rea-
sonable assumption. Thus our model ﬁts the conditions of the theorem,
and the result is established.
Appendix C. Proof of proposition 3
To prove this proposition begin by considering condition (18)
d
de1
P^i e1ð Þb
d
de1
A e1; qið Þ for all e1; qi: ð55Þ
By Lemma 1, we have that
P^i e1ð Þ ¼ A e2 e1; qmð Þje1; qi
 
; ð56Þ
hence this condition becomes
d
de1
A e2 e1; qmð Þje1; qi
 
− d
de1
A e1; qið Þb0 for all e1; qi: ð57Þ
Now consider condition (19):
dA e1; qið Þ
de1
− qi
dW e1;λLð Þ
de1
þ 1−qið Þ
dW e1;λHð Þ
de1
 
b0 ð58Þ
for all e1, qi. Since
dA e1; qið Þ
de1
¼ qi
dW e2 e1; qið Þje1;λLð Þ
de1
þ 1−qið Þ
dW e2 e1; qið Þje1;λHð Þ
de1
ð59Þ
we can write the expression on the left hand side of (60) as
qi
dW e2 e1; qið Þje1;λLð Þ
de1
−dW
 e1;λLð Þ
de1
	 

þ 1−qið Þ
 dW e

2 e1; qið Þje1;λHð Þ
de1
− dW
 e1;λHð Þ
de1
	 

ð60Þ
¼ qi
dA e2 e1; qið Þje1;1ð Þ
de1
− dA
 e1;1ð Þ
de1
	 

þ 1−qið Þ
 dA e

2 e1; qið Þje1;0ð Þ
de1
− dA
 e1;0ð Þ
de1
	 

: ð61Þ
Notice that both the square brackets in this expression are of a sim-
ilar form to (59). Thus both conditions (59) and (60) will be satisﬁed if
Ω q; q0
 
−Ω q0; q0
 
b0 for all q≠q0 ð62Þ
where
Ω q; q0
 
:¼ d
de1
A e2 e1; qð Þje1; q0
 
: ð63ÞThis is equivalent to saying that Ω(q, q′), treated as a function of q,
should have a global maximum at q = q′, for all q′. For this to be so it
is sufﬁcient for
sgn
dΩ x; q0
 
dx

x¼q
0@ 1A ¼ sgn q0−q : ð64Þ
This sign condition ensures that Ω(q, q′) is a single peaked function
of q, and that its maximum is attained at q= q′.
We are thus interested in computing
d
dq
Ω q; q0
  ¼ d2
dqde1
A e2 e1; qð Þje1; q0
 
: ð65Þ
As a preliminary step, note that by deﬁnition,
A2 e

2 e1; qð Þje1; q
  ¼ 0: ð66Þ
Implicitly differentiating this identity with respect to e1 and q
respectively, we have,
de2
de1
¼−A21
A22
ð67Þ
de2
dq
¼−A2q
A22
: ð68Þ
By assumption (26), A22 b 0, and it is easily shown that assumptions
(27) and (28) ensure that
A21b0 ð69Þ
A2qN0 ð70Þ
respectively. Hence the optimal policy e2∗(e1, q) is decreasing in e1 and
increasing in q.
As a short hand, we will use the symbol A to refer to the function
A(e2∗(e1, q)|e1, q), and A′will refer to the function A(e2∗(e1, q)|e1, q′). Now,
d2
dqde1
A e2 e1; qð Þjq0; e1
  ð71Þ
¼ d
dq
A02
de2
de1
þ A01
 
ð72Þ
¼ A022
de2
dq
þ A02q
 
de2
de1
þ A02
d2e2
de1dq
þ A021
de2
dq
þ A01q ð73Þ
¼ A022
−A2q
A22
þ 0
 −A21
A22
þ A02
d2e2
de1dq
þ A021
−A2q
A22
þ 0 ð74Þ
¼ A2q
A22ð Þ2
A022A21−A22A
0
21
 þ A02 d2e2de1dq : ð75Þ
The factor in the round brackets in the ﬁrst term is antisymmetric
under the change of variables q↔ q′, and thus changes sign at q = q′.
The second term is proportional to A2′ which also changes sign at q =
q′. Thus the whole expression changes sign at q= q′ provided the coef-
ﬁcients that multiply the factors that are switching sign are of deﬁnite
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the same (and not opposite) signs.
From (66), we want it to be the case that when q b q′, the whole
expression in (77) is positive. Consider the ﬁrst term in (77) — we
want this to be positive when q b q′. The fact A2q N 0, so we need the
factor inside the brackets to be positive for q b q′, i.e.
qbq0⇒
A022
A021
N
A22
A21
: ð76Þ
A sufﬁcient condition that ensures this is:
∂
∂q
A22
A21
 
N0 ð77Þ
⇒
A22q
A22
N
A21q
A21
: ð78Þ
Now consider the second term in (77). A2′ N 0 when q b q′ (this fol-
lows from A22 b 0, and from the monotonicity of e2∗ in q), so the second
term will be positive if d
2e2
de1dq
is positive. We now look for conditions that
ensure that this is the case.
Recall that the optimal policy e2∗(e1, q) satisﬁes (68). Implicitly differ-
entiating (68) with respect to e1 leads to an equation that deﬁnes
de2
de1
in
terms of e2∗ , e1, and q. We then have:
d2e2
dqde1
¼ ∂∂e2
de2
de1
 
de2
dq
þ ∂∂q
de2
de1
: ð79Þ
Sincede

2
dq N0by assumption, the following conditions ensure that
d2e2
de1dq
N0:
∂
∂e2
de2
de1
N0 ð80Þ
∂
∂q
de2
de1
N0: ð81Þ
Using the fact that de

2
de1
¼−A21A22, these inequalities become,
A221
A21
b
A222
A22
ð82Þ
A21q
A21
b
A22q
A22
: ð83Þ
The second of these inequalities is identical to (80), while the ﬁrst
inequality is a new condition.
For convenience, denote WL := W(e2|e1, λL), WH := W(e2|e1, λH).
Consider the inequality
A22q
A22
N
A21q
A21
ð84Þ
⇒
WL22−WH22
qWL22 þ 1−qð ÞWH22
N
WL21−WH21
qWL21 þ 1−qð ÞWH21
ð85Þ
⇒
1
WL21W
H
21
WL22
WL21
−W
H
22
WH21
 !
N0; ð86Þwhere the last line follows after two or three lines of algebra. For this
inequality to be satisﬁed, it is sufﬁcient for
∂
∂λ
W22
W21
b0 ð87Þ
⇒
W22λ
W22
b
W21λ
W21
: ð88Þ
Similarly, one can show that
W222
W22
N
W221
W21
⇒
A222
A22
N
A221
A21
: ð89Þ
Thus, we have shown that (90) and (91) are sufﬁcient to ensure
Ω(q, q′)−Ω(q′, q′) b 0 for all q, q′. Simplemanipulation of these two in-
equalities shows that they can be written in terms of the elasticities ϵx|y
in Proposition 3.
Appendix D. Proof of proposition 4
When political competition is exogenous, each parties' equilibrium
policy is to offer its own individual optimum, so the value of the political
game to party i is given by
P^i e1ð Þ ¼ kiA e2 e1; qið Þje1; qi
 þ 1−kið ÞA e2 e1; qj e1; qi ; ð90Þ
where ki is some constant, and ki = 1− kj. Thus,
d
de1
A e1; qið Þ−P^i e1ð Þ
 
¼ 1−kið Þ
d
de1
A e2 e1; qið Þje1; qi
 
−A e2 e1; qj
 e1; qi  
¼ 1−kið Þ Ω qi; qið Þ−Ω qj; qi
  
≥0
ð91Þ
where the inequality follows from the proof of Proposition 3. Thus the
condition (18) in Lemma 2 continues to hold in this case, and we
know from Proposition 3 that the conditions (30–31) on W ensure
that the condition (19) in Lemma 2 also holds. Thus the result is
established.
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